 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
European Review of Philosophy, 6
Christine van Geen and Frédérique de Vignemont Are all mental representations conceptual? Can concepts represent the fineness of grain of mental states such as emotions, bodily sensations and perceptual states? What is the nature of mental representations in non-linguistic and pre-linguistic creatures? The present volume tackles this debate by asking how far the analogy between the structure of conceptual and nonconceptual content can be carried. Should similarity in structure be assumed in order to explain how nonconceptual states are conceptualized? And conversely, how can nonconceptual content retain its specificity, if its structure matches that of conceptual representations? By bringing together conceptualists and nonconceptualists, this volume provides a detailed state of the art on this debate and to shed new light on an issue of particular interest for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. View this volume on-line (PDF).
10/1/2006 ISBN (Paperback): 1575865300 |
  Distributed by the University of Chicago Press |
| Series: European Review of Philosophy |
|
pubs@Csli.stanford.edu |
 |