...Demonstratives
This (unfortunately) rather intricate paper has a major defect: it is in large parts a published response to two yet unpublished papers: Mark Sainsbury's paper ``Fregean Indexicals'' will be published in the collection of the papers from the workshop Intentional Phenomena in Context, John Perry's ``Understanding Evans on Demonstratives'' exists until now just as a manuscript. But I hope I have represented my discussion partners in enough detail that my reader can follow the argument. The paper owes a great deal to points made in the discussions in the ``language-lunch'' group and discussions of an earlier version on the workshop Intentional Phenomena in Context in Hamburg 1995. For their helpful criticism I have to thank Christian Beyer, Peter Gardenfors, Wolfgang Künne and Greg O'Hair. Peter Baumann, Julius Moravcsik and Ed Zalta have read the manuscript and made detailed comments. Thanks very much. Special thanks to John Perry for allowing me to use his unpublished material and to Mark Sainsbury for his comments which reached me unfortunately to late to be adequately reflected in this draft. Finally I have to thank two institutions: the support of CSLI and the Humboldt-Foundation made my work on this topic possible.
...defined.
Donald Davidson: The Structure and Content of Truth. In: Journal of Philosophy 1990, p. 289.
...language.''
John McDowell: On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name. In: Mind 86 (1977). Reprinted in: Reference, Truth and Reality (ed. Mark de bretton Platts) . London 1980, p. 141.
...true.
A caveat is necessary at this point. Evans attempts to elaborate and defend Frege's semantic theory. Evans characterizes Frege's theory as a version of interpretational semantics:
``The interpretational semanticist seeks to characterize the notion of an admissible interpretation of a language, or language-fragment, considered as made up of expressions of certain definite semantic categories; expressions of the same category receive, upon any admissible interpretation, an assignment of the same kind.'' (Gareth Evans: Varieties of Reference ( VR) (ed. John McDowell). Oxford 1982, p. 33)

Davidson pursues another semantic strategy. He tries to define the predicate ``is true3#3'' recursively for a natural language L, without regard of the possibility of alternative interpretations. But this difference between Frege and Davidson does not prevent Evans from helping the latter with the conceptual resources of the former:
``The similarity between a Davidsonian conception of the theory of meaning as a theory of truth, and a Fregean conception of a theory of sense as a theory of reference should be particularily striking. Davidson lightens the ontological load, but the general idea is the same.'' (Gareth Evans: ``Understanding Demonstratives'' (UD). Reprinted in: Collected Papers. Oxford 1985, S. 295.)

For the sake of exposition I will follow Evans in ignoring this difference between Frege and Davidson.
...content.
This is John Perry's term, compare: Indexicals and Demonstratives, forthcoming in: A companion to the Philosophy of Language (ed. Bob Hale and Crispin Wright)
...utterance.''
Brian Loar: The Semantics of Singular Terms. In: Philosophical Studies 30 1976, S. 357.
...meaning'.''
Michael Dummett: The Relative Priority of Thought and Language. In: Frege and other Philosophers, Oxford 1991, p. 322.
...``I''-utterances.
If one can speak in the case of ``I'' at all of identifying the referent.
...have.''
Donald Davidson: Afterthoughts to A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In: Reading Rorty (ed. Malachowski), S. 134.
...fundamental?''
ibid, S. 136.
...true.
cf. Richard Routley: Necessary Limits of Knowledge: Unknowable Truths''. In: Philosophie als Wissenschaft (ed.: Morscher, Neumaier, Zecha). Bad Reichenhall 1981; Wolfgang Künne: Bolzanos blühender Baum. In: Realismus und Antirealismus (ed. Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg). Frankfurt 1992.
...state''.
Willard Van Orman Quine: From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass., S. 132.
...meaning.''
Donald Davidson: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984, XIV.
...sentences.
In the latest formulation of this principle the languages under consideration are idiolects. Cf. The Structure and Content of Truth, p. 312.
...knowledge.
Michael Dummett: What is a Theory of Meaning (I). In: The Seas of Language. Oxford 1993, p. 1.
...epistemology.''
ibid, p. 2.
...Afla
The subscript ``E" indicates that the Reference-relation is defined for English expressions. I will use this notation also for the other clauses.
...problem.
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore: Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford/Cambridge, Mass. 1992, S. 62.
...white''.
Donald Davidson: Truth and Meaning. Reprinted in: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford 1984, p. 26 fn11.
...Interpretation''.
cf. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, S. 138.
...meaning.
Willard Orman van Quine: Review of of Evans/McDowell Truth and Meaning. In: Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977).
...constraints''.
cf: Donald Davidson: Radical Interpretation; Reply to Foster.
...truth.''
Radical Interpretation, p. 135.
...on.
Compare: Jonathan Bennett: Critical Notice: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. In: Mind 1985, p. 612.
...speakers''
Radical Interpretation, p. 139.
...claims.''
ibid, S. 174.
......
This formulation contains the intensional operator ``theory t states that''. Naturally such an operator causes problems for a truth-theory. Davidson deals with these problems in his ``Reply to Foster', p. 175.
...form.''
Alfred Tarski: The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages''. In: Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics. New York/Oxford 1956, S. 166.
...t.''
Donald Davidson: Truth and Meaning, p. 34.
...result.
As William Lycan has shown in Logical Form in Natural Language. Cambridge, Mass., p. 48.
...it.
Logical Form in Natural Language, p. 49.
...promised.''
Arthur N. Prior: I. In: Jowett Papers 1968--1969 (ed. B.Y. Khanbhai, R.S. Katz and R.A. Pineau). Oxford 1970, p. 3.
...here.)''
Donald Davidson: Reply to Foster, p. 175.
...demonstratives.
Prior supplies further arguments. Compare: I, p. 3.
...veritate.''
Truth and Meaning, p. 34.
...feature.''
Donald Davidson: Truth and Meaning, p. 34.
...it.''
Gareth Evans: Does Tense Logic Rest upon a Mistake. In: Gareth Evans: Collected Papers, p. 346.
...fan].''
Mark Sainsbury: Fregean Indexicals, Mp. 1995, p. 6. I changed the example. Compare also: Tyler Burge: Demonstrative Constructions, Reference and Truth. In: Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), p. 208.
...conception.
(UD), S. 295.
...language.
Donald Davidson: Reply to Foster, p. 175.
...states.''
John Foster: Meaning and Truth Theory. In: Truth and Meaning (ed. Gareth Evans and John McDowell), Oxford 1976, p. 19.
...is.''
Michael Dummett: Frege -- Philosophy of Language. Second Edition, London 1981, p. 227.
...sense.''
UD, p. 295.
...sense.
VR, p. 26.
...unmysterious.
VR, p. 26.
...descriptive.''
Michael Dummett: Existence. In: The Seas of Language, S. 299.
...day.''
John Perry: Frege in Demonstratives. In: Philosophical Review 86 (1977), p. 485.
...sense.''
UD, p. 15.
...''
UD, p. 303. I substituted my numbering for Evans' own.
...permanently.''
John Perry: Understanding Evans on Demonstratives. Unpublished Manuscript, p. 8. Compare also: The Problem of the Essential Indexical, p. 15 fn4.
...occasion.''
UD, p. 304. I think we can safely interpret the ``if'' as ``iff''.
...languages.''
Arthur N. Prior: I, p. 3.
...today.''
John Perry: Understanding Evans on Demonstratives, p. 10.
...question.''
Understanding Evans on Demonstratives, p. 11.
...today'.''
Understanding Evans on Demonstratives, p. 10.
...d.''
UD, p. 305.
...utterance.''
Ian Rumfitt: Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised. In: Mind (1993), p. 443 fn23.
...supplementation.''
UD, p. 305.
...papers
Starting with: `He': A Study in the Logic of Self-consciousness'', In: Ratio, VIII (1966) continuing with: Indicators and Quasi-Indicators. In: American Philosophical Quarterly, IV (1967) and: On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others. In: Journal of Philosophy LXV (1968).
...early.''
``He'': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness, p. 132.
...made.''
Hector-Neri Castañeda: On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others, p. 440
...role.
cf. Steven E. Boër 25#25 William Lycan: Who, Me? In: Philosophical Review 1980. John Perry: Castañeda on He and I. Reprinted in: The Problem of the Essential Indexical, Oxford 1993.
...again.''
Who, Me?, p. 454.
...F''.
ibid., p. 455.
...overpaid.''
Castañeda on He and I, p. 110.
...sort:
The strategy of conditionalization goes back to Scott Weinstein: Truth and Demonstratives. In: Noûs 8 (1974) and Tyler Burge: Demonstrative constructions, reference, and truth. In: Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974). But for instance Burge's antecedents for the T-theorems differ significantly from Sainsbury's. More about this topic in the next section.
...Truth''.
Journal of Philosophy 1974.
...here.
For example in: Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1994.
...sentence.''
Tyler Burge: Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth, p. 212.
...off.''
Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought, p. 93.
...understood.
Compare Higginbotham's res about ``Tomorrow is July 4'' on p. 94.
......''
Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought, p. 94.
...sentences.''
Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth, p. 223.
...word.''
Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought, p. 95.
...components.''
David Kaplan: Afterthoughtp. In: Themes from Kaplan, p. 606.
...way.''
Gareth Evans: The Varieties of Reference, p. 171.

Edward N. Zalta
Mon Oct 30 15:35:15 PST 1995