Although Perry's arguments could be invalidated,
neither the introduction of indicators nor the introduction of
quasi-indicators into the meta-language have led to a truth-theory
which realized Evans' goal, namely to give a truth-theory which serves
as a theory of propositional content. The understanding of indexical
utterances has been a stumbling block for all attempts hitherto
presented. So it seems to be time for a new idea. The new proposal for
a truth-conditional format I will be considering now was originally
developed by Tyler Burge in his article ``Demonstrative Constructions,
Reference, and Truth''.
James Higginbotham has taken up Burge's idea and used it in connection
with the meaning-theoretic purposes we are considering
here.
What is the new idea? We know already from the last section the idea that it is for some purposes useful to work with the notion of conditional truth-conditions. Sainsbury used in his theory conditional truth-conditions whose consequents were referentially linked to their antecedents by anaphorical relations. Higginbotham uses also the notion of a conditional T-sentence, but like Burge and unlike Sainsbury he incorporates the predicate `` s refers to x with t'' in the antecedent of conditional T-sentence. The basic form of such a conditional T-sentence is:
Burge sketches one of the main intuitions that underlies this conception thus:
containing demonstrative constructions are neither true nor false apart from actual use. To evaluate `That is a dog' as true or false, we need someone to use `that' referentially. For this reason, formal representations of sentences involving demonstrative constructions are open sentences. The object-language user completes the semantical interpretation of such open sentences extralinguistically---via his act(s) of reference. One might intuitively think of the language user as reaching out into the world to grasp an object to satisfy his open sentence.''In chapter X we saw that what is relevant for the semantic evaluation of an indexical utterance is the object therein indexically referred to. This was Kaplan basic insight and it was reflected in his treatment of the semantics indexical expressions. This led to Kaplan's thesis that an indexical contributes to the content of an utterance only its value on the occasion of utterance, i.e. the object denoted. Burge's conditional conception of T-sentences accords well with this thesis. Burge's conditional truth-conditions also assign a central role to the object indexically referred to. The object itself determines for instance the the truth-value of the indexical utterance.
But our initial question was: Can a truth-theory ``show'' the sense an indexical has on the occasion of utterance. We have not yet found a truth-theory which allows us to answer this question positively. Higginbotham thinks that a truth-theory of the sort Burge envisages does equal justice to Evans' and Kaplan's observations about indexical expressions. Higginbotham asks whether on Burge's view indexical expressions have a sense. His answer is:
one sense, it appears, they do not; for they enter what is expressed only through the value they determine in an utterance. But in another sense they obviously do; for they require that the speaker has singled out an object to which reference is being made. The sense that the words carry is wrapped up in whatever capacities are required to bring this performance off.''The end of Higginbotham's reply suggests that he thinks that conditional T-sentences for indexical utterances somehow ``involve'' the completing sense of the indexical. The sense is not involved in the right-hand side of the consequence of the T-sentence, which is supposed to give us the conditions under which an utterance of the sentence under consideration is true. But the antecedent involves the completing sense of the relevant indexical. Now, the meaning of ``involve'' or ``wrapp'' in this context is not clear. Let us try to clarify it.
Consider the following example. A speaker S refers with the
demonstrative ``that'' to a dog. This act of the speaker is based on
the exercise of certain abilities, in this case the capacity to
discriminate objects visually. The exercise of this ability, the
visual discrimination of the dog, is a way of thinking of the dog.
In Higginbotham's opinion the connection between this way of thinking
of an object and the use of the demonstrative seems to be that the
competent referential use of ``that'' requires that one thinks in this
specific way of the object one wants to refer to. A competent
use of an expressions is for Higginbotham a use with knowledge of the
conditions under which it is understood.
The conditional view of the truth conditions for indexical sentences locates the knowledge someone must have for understanding an indexical utterance not in the T-sentence itself, but in the condition prefixed to the T-sentence. The instantiation problem seems therefore not to arise. We can instantiate the generic T-sentence any way we want, as long we instantiate it with singular terms with the right reference.
Higginbotham puts forth a claim about understanding very similar to Evans' view:
say on day d, `Tomorrow is July 4'. Understanding of this utterance, and the competent production of it (that is, production of it with knowledge of the conditions under which it is understood) requires that one think of the day d' (that is, d + 1) as the day following d ...''To discuss this claim I switch to the correlated indicator ``today''. Higginbotham would assign the following truth-conditions to an utterance of ``today is fine'':
,
then
is fine
But someone can grasp the conditional truth-conditions Higginbotham assigns to an utterance ``today is fine'' and know all the facts about the utterance and the utterance-context to infer an unconditional T-sentence without understanding the utterance in the strong sense. Imagine I say on day d ``today is fine''. In order to arrive at an unconditional T-sentence which interprets my utterance my addressee must (i) recognize that the utterance is an utterance of the English sentence ``today is fine'' by me, (ii) that I refer with ``today'' in this utterance to day d. A speaker who knows all this and makes the required inferences will not necessarily think the thought required for understanding the utterance in the strong sense, namely the thought he could express with the words: ``What the speaker says is true if and only if it is fine today''.
That this is so is shown by a variation of an example with which we are already familiar. Imagine me listen to a recording of an utterance of Mr. X saying: ``today is fine''. On the tape is written: ``Date of recording: July 4''. Given this knowledge I can infer from the conditional truth-conditions of the utterance that it is true if and only if July 4 is fine. This is surely not the thought required for understanding the utterance in the strong sense. But more important is that I have not arrived at this thought in the right way. In order to understand Mr. X' utterance in the strong sense I should have directly identified the day of utterance. I should have reasoned on the day of utterance: `` `Today' in Mr. X' utterance refers to today, so what he is saying is true if and only if today is fine.''
Higginbotham's theory does not discriminate between understanding in the weak and the strong sense. Burge's remark about the conditional conception of truth-conditions clarifies this point of criticism:
[...] interpreting any utterance of a [noneternal] sentence involves attempting to correlate the utterance with entities that are extralinguistically identified by the speaker in the act of reference. The use of semantical theory in formalizing such interpretation yields a picture of much (I think almost all) of ordinary linguistic communication as a process in which the speaker utters open, incompletely interpreted sentences and acts in such a way as to enable the hearer to complete the interpretation of them and incorporate them into his own system of interpretation as closed sentences.''In order to understand an utterance of ``Today is fine'' the hearer must according to the conditional view identify the object the speaker of the utterance has referred to. But, and this is clearly shown by the example, a hearer can interpret an indexical utterance in the sense required by the theory, without understanding the utterance in the strong sense. For this latter achievement it is necessary to identify the object the speaker referred to in a specific way, for the former achievement this is not necessary.
But there is a second reading of Higginbothams paper which seems to avoid these problems. Higginbotham writes about an conditional T-sentence like the one we have been discussing:
[...] the semantics [...] of the representation for ``Tomorrow is July 4'' does after all include a completing sense of the word ``tomorrow'', since it is this sense that must be grasped by someone who refers to a day with that word.''This passage seems to indicate that not the concept of understanding an indexical utterance is central but that of making an indexical reference. Higginbotham's position seems to be that one cannot refer to x with for example ``that'' without thinking of x in a special way. This fact, Higginbotham argues, is displayed in the antecedent of the T-sentence.
But can the concept of making a reference with a term really bear the weight Higginbotham is burdening it with? Must someone, who uses for instance an indexical referentially, think of the referent of the indexical in a special way, must he be, to use David Kaplan's famous phrase, be ``en rapport'' with the object indicated? Kaplan himself gives a negative answer to this question. He writes:
proponents of connectivity urge that although the language enables us to express contents that would otherwise be inaccessible (thus contradicting subjectivist semantics), something more, something like being en rapport with the components of the content, is required to apprehend the content (and thus to hold attitudes towards it). I think of the proposal as a requirement that we have knowledge of the components.''And Gareth Evans argues in connection with reflections about demonstratives:
, and indeed in general, the notion of understanding a reference of a certain type is a more fundamental notion than the notion of making a reference of that type, because of the possibility of exploiting an established device of reference in order to manifest the intention to be understood in a certain way, when one is not in a position to understand one's own words in that way.''Evans also hints in this quotation at a reason for this view. I can, even if I am blind-folded, point out an object and say ``This is a dog''. In this situation I demonstratively refer to an object, but I cannot fully understand my utterance. This is shown by the fact that any addresse must perceive the object I have demonstratively referred to in order to fully understand my re. Therefore the concept of reference is not intimately connected to the concept of a mode of presentation. A theory that dealt just with the ability to make referential utterances wouldn't need the concept of a mode of presentation.
But it seems now that Kaplan and Evans have underdescribed their examples. Higginbotham focused on competent indexical reference. Can we say that in the above example of the ``blind'' demonstrative reference the expression ``that'' was only incompetently used?
No. I use the expression with knowledge of the conditions under which it is understood. I know that the hearer must perceive the object I demonstrated and think that it is a dog in order to fully understand my remark. I know that this is so, and I exploit this knowledge to in my act of reference. I can intend to refer to the object demonstratively although I cannot perceive it because I know under which conditions my utterance will be understood and that others can fulfill these conditions.
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